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Abstract. The range of actors, or “players”, involved in the transactions of diplomacy 
occasioned by sport are manifold. In the case of the world‟s “global game” – association 
football – they include but are not limited to individual footballers, football clubs, 
national leagues, national associations, football‟s international governance structures, 
multi-national sponsors, and numerous hangers on. Importantly for this analysis, such a 
panoply of actors creates an architecture, replicated across other sports, which speak to 
the necessity of furthering the understanding of the relationship between sport and 
diplomacy. These two phenomena share a long-standing similarity in global affairs; both 
having been over-looked as means of comprehending relations between different polities 
otherwise centred on the nation-state. This exegesis advances our understanding in two 
areas. First, it addresses the parameters of the discussion of “sport and diplomacy” and 
problematises the discourse between the two with a note on language; and second, it 
utilises a framework provided by an appreciation of “global diplomacy” to explore 
concepts of communication, representation, and negotiation in sport and diplomacy.  
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At the close of the English Premier League‟s January 2016 transfer window, the manager 
of Arsenal Football Club, Arsene Wenger, observed of the influence of the Chinese Super 
League, “China looks to have the financial power to move the whole league of Europe to 
China”.1 Known and occasionally, mocked, as a “le professeur” for his studious manner, 
Wenger‟s remarks acknowledged the influence of a “new player” on the football 
landscape, adding with a wry appreciation of global affairs: “if there‟s a very strong 
political desire, we should worry”. Wenger recognised the “political desire” came from 
China‟s government.  
The Chinese Super League broke its transfer record three times in one week, 
culminating in the €50 million transfer of Brazilian midfielder Alex Teixeira from the 
Ukrainian team, Shakthar Donetsk, to Jiangsu Suning, outbidding Liverpool Football 
Club from the English Premier League Club in the process. The total expenditure to that 
point in the Chinese transfer window was £199.5 million – €258.9 million – outstripping 
the supposedly cash-rich English Premier League‟s total of £175m – €227m euros. Whilst 
illustrating succinctly their take on how capitalism and communism can co-exist, the 
interest of People‟s Republic of China‟s Communist leadership in football and sport more 
generally is real. From the largess of hosting the 2008 Summer Olympic Games in 
Beijing to the support given to the Chinese Super League, the backing comes from the 
top. The leader of the PRC since 2013, President Xi Jinping, “is a big football fan”, 
which has led to a “huge and unprecedented football revolution in China led by him, 
which has turned the game on its head”.2  During a state visit to Britain in late 2015, amid 
his other commitments, Xi visited the Manchester City Etihad Campus training ground 
that gave rise to a remarkable “selfie”. The photograph taken by City‟s Argentine centre 
3 
 
 
forward, Sergio Aguero, captured himself, Xi, and British Prime Minister David 
Cameron, albeit squeezed in on the right hand side.
3
 Aguero shared this image to his 9.6 
million twitter followers: “Good to hear about the China news. Remember this? I look 
forward to visiting soon”. Whatever the travel plans of the player, the photograph 
consolidated a business transaction between his team, owned by Abu Dhabi‟s City 
Football Group, and a consortium of Chinese state-backed investment firms facilitated by 
their respective national governments.  
From this episode, it is possible to identify a range of actors involved in the 
transactions of diplomacy occasioned by sport, including but not limited to individual 
footballers, football clubs, national leagues, national associations, football‟s international 
governance structures, sponsors, investment firms, and the president of the world‟s most 
populous country.  Importantly for the purposes of this analysis, these insights and 
incidents speak to the necessity of furthering the understanding of the relationship 
between sport and diplomacy. These two phenomena share a longstanding similarity in 
global affairs; both having been overlooked as means of comprehending relations 
between different polities centred on the nation-state. This exegesis advances our 
understanding in two areas. First, it addresses the parameters of the discussion of “Sport 
and Diplomacy” and problematises the discourse between the two with a note on 
language; second, it utilises a framework provided by an appreciation of “Global 
Diplomacy” to explore concepts of communication, representation, and negotiation in 
sport and diplomacy.  
The realm of sport and diplomacy have enjoyed a recent renaissance. After having 
long been over-looked by mainstream academic disciplines, there has a noticeable 
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increase in attention to these twin features of global discourse since 2013. A number of 
dedicated journal articles – not least those within these pages of Diplomacy and Statecraft 
– two journal special editions, a couple of recent books, and discussion in specific 
disciplines such as history have sought to expand the discourse.
4
 As Stuart Murray states 
in his seminal 2012 article, he sought to “prompt discussion and debate” with a view to 
producing a “more durable relationship between sports and diplomacy”.5 Those 
discussions and that debate are now well underway, to which this article now adds.  
 Murray‟s work has sought to provide insight into “sports diplomacy”; and he does 
so with no little aplomb. A key point to take at the outset from Murray‟s analysis is in the 
terminology of sports diplomacy, which he acknowledges has been victim to “over-
simplification”.6 By referring to the subject of analysis as “sport diplomacy”, he 
establishes a particular relationship between “sport” and “diplomacy” where the former 
may appear subservient to the latter or, at least, a prefix. It also makes analysis contingent 
on a particular conception of diplomacy, something that itself has the capacity for change 
as seen in on going debates over “new diplomacy” and explored in this enquiry. Murray 
and Geoffrey Pigman do offer initial further steps by distinguishing between “sport-as-
diplomacy”, which entails the negotiations that take place in surrounding sporting 
occasions, and the “international diplomacy of sport” where governments utilise sport as 
a means to pursue policy and national interests.
7
 
Murray is, however, far from alone in using the language that makes “sport” a 
prefix to the subject.
8
 Other academic disciplines draw on “sport” in their own particular 
way: historians use “sport history”; and political science‟s counterpart is “sport politics”.9 
The journal of the North American Society for Sport History is entitled the “Journal of 
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Sport History”, for example; the British Society of Sports History‟s journal is “Sport in 
History” – formerly “The Sports Historian” and then the “International Journal of the 
History of Sport”.  Jonathan Grix‟s recent book, Sport Politics: An Introduction, stands 
along side Lincoln Allison‟s well-regarded The Politics of Sport and subsequent The 
Changing Politics of Sport.
10
 Indeed, a particular dimension of the sporting topography, 
albeit a domineering one in the Olympic Games, has spawned “Olympic politics” and 
“Olympic history”. Christopher Hill‟s book Olympic Politics speaks to it specifically, and 
Aaron Beacom to Olympic diplomacy in his excellent 2012 study, “International 
Diplomacy and the Olympic Movement – The New Mediators”.11 
It is necessary, therefore, to tie “sport” and “diplomacy” together into “sport and 
diplomacy”: to see these two facets of contemporary global society as equally valuable 
lenses that reflect the contributions of the other. The placement of a conjunction “and” 
may seem a semantic matter; but the point is that there is an increased value in 
understanding the subject in broadening the context by using two-way reflection from 
one realm in the other. The precision needed will avoid conflating distinct areas of study. 
David Black and Byron Peacock, whilst entitling their contribution to the Oxford 
Handbook of Modern Diplomacy, “Sport and Diplomacy”, in fact use “sport diplomacy” 
as a synonym. They refer to the “politico-diplomatic nature of international sport” and 
sport conforming to “traditional „club‟ diplomacy” of the old variety and, in doing so, 
conflate the realms of politics and diplomacy even if that was not their intention.
12
 The 
argument here in contrast is that by seeking to explore sport and diplomacy, it is more 
useful to treat the two as separate but equal realms rather as one subservient to the other. 
To illustrate the necessity for precision, one needs to dwell momentarily upon the 
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much-used adage that “sport and politics don‟t mix”. The notion has been successfully 
deconstructed in Lincoln Allison‟s 1986 term, the “myth of autonomy”, and is 
nonsensical when given more than a moment‟s thought.13 “Sport and politics cannot be 
mutually isolated”, Trevor Taylor succinctly wrote.14 Indeed the examples that are readily 
used to associate sport and politics have become cliché.  In terms of the Olympics, for 
instance, Adolf Hitler‟s “Nazi” games of 1936, the “Black Power” salute of American 
athletes, Tommie Smith and John Carlos, in 1968 at Mexico City, and the tit-for-tat Cold 
War boycotts of 1980 and 1984. There were also the sporting boycotts of South Africa 
that seemed to culminate in the image of then President Nelson Mandela passing South 
African captain, François Pienaar, the 1995 World Rugby Cup winner‟s trophy whilst 
wearing a Springbok jersey.
15
 These examples, nee caricatures, suffer from use as a 
“short-hand” that fails to acknowledge the detail of each episode, whilst also supposing a 
conflation of the “political” experience of sport that these episodes do not share. Perhaps 
the most egregious example that mystifies the casual observer is of “Ping-Pong” 
diplomacy that “opened up” Sino-American relations in the early 1970.16 Despite, or 
perhaps because, of Nicholas Griffin‟s engaging and well-researched popular 2014 book, 
Ping-Pong Diplomacy: The Secret History Behind the Game that Changed the World, the 
episode has acquired a mythical status as the example beyond all others that “sport” can 
influence diplomacy.
17
 The reality in this analysis, alongside the others in this special 
issue and those elsewhere, is a more complex and inter-woven narrative than these 
familiar episodes suggest.  
A final point in setting out the parameters to sport and diplomacy is to delimit the 
scope of diplomacy and politics. It is not a straightforward task; the delimitation is 
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limited, the difference blurred, but it is nevertheless a worthwhile endeavour because to 
enhance the understanding of sport and diplomacy, diplomacy needs to be distinct from 
politics. The latter, politics, concerns the message; the former, diplomacy, the mode of 
the message. They are inter-related – intimately at times and not mutually exclusive. 
When Erich Honecker, the future leader of the German Democratic Republic and, in 
1948, chairman of the Free German Youth Movement, stated that “sport is not an end in 
itself, but the means to an end”, he was more accurately identifying sports‟ diplomatic 
qualities than its political ones.
18
 There is accordingly value in comprehending the 
particular art and practices of diplomacy.  
Definitions, discussions, and reflections on diplomacy abound. Two inter-related 
examples provide foundation to this on-going discussion. First, Geoff Berridge aligns 
diplomacy to the nature state, before turning to its capacity for co-operation and 
compromise in stating: “The chief purpose of diplomacy has always been to enable states 
to secure the objectives of their foreign policies without resort to force, propaganda, or 
law – in short, by lobbying and negotiation”.19 In some contrast, Harold Nicolson, 
doyenne of diplomatists, reflected in a 1961 article in Foreign Affairs on the “old 
principle” of diplomacy: “the art of negotiation depends on reliability and confidence is 
an eternal principle, however much one's antagonists may profit by temporary tricks”. 
Nicolson continued, “I have frequently written that good diplomacy is akin to sound 
banking and depends on credit. Even if your opponent scores a trick or two by sharp 
practice, you should yourself abide by the rules of the game”.20 It is perhaps telling that 
Nicolson ends by reminding his reader of the need to abide by “the rules of the game”, 
not because of any foretelling of the synergy of the phrase with this article, but because it 
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reveals his appreciation that the rules of any game need to be “negotiated” and respected 
by all the participants. This forms a pleasing parallel between sport and diplomacy as the 
mutual acceptance of agreed rules governs so much of diplomacy. 
The edges to the field of sport and diplomacy are not yet marked; but as anyone 
who has ever played or observed pick-up soccer, basketball, cricket, or any other sport for 
that matter, one does not need fixed lines on the field of play for the sport to play out. The 
accepted protocols of sport transcend the responsibilities of nation-states, and 
international sporting federations and at lower levels are ungoverned except by the 
participants: the goalposts are jumpers, the footpath one boundary, the school wall 
another, and the “next goal wins”.  
Nicolson, further warns of the danger of “the misuse of the word “diplomacy” to 
signify both foreign policy and negotiation”, which serves to re-enforce the point made 
regarding the distinction between diplomacy and politics – the outcome of which is 
foreign policy.  In discussing change in diplomacy, and particularly the notion of “new 
diplomacy”, returning to Nicolson is useful.21 Nicolson‟s 1953 lectures at Oxford 
University, published as The Evolution of Diplomacy, argue not to discount the “old 
diplomacy” encompassing ancient Greek, Italian, and French diplomacy in considering 
what is new. He stated that these regimes should be considered “objectively and with 
some realisation” as “infinitely more efficient” than the methods of new, “open” 
diplomacy when writing in 1953.
22
  Whether they were or not is moot, the point being 
that in debating the parameters of sport and diplomacy, there is value in looking to 
previous work, and beyond an immediate focus on what is in the line of sight. What this 
point also suggests is that the nature of diplomacy does not change: its character does. It 
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is in this regard that the application of practice becomes important, not least to ensure that 
the discourse of sport and diplomacy recognises the role of practice and practitioners – 
players, administrators, businesses, and spectators.  
Sport and diplomacy sits at the intersection of sport and particular academic 
disciplines, given the underpinning qualities of diplomacy to social, political, and 
economic relations between and amongst individuals, organisations, and, of course, 
nation-states in global affairs. It is to the global dimension that this analysis now turns.  
 To think of sport as global phenomena is self-evident in the twenty-first century.  
Sporting contests taking place in any arena on the planet connects an audience in a shared 
experience provided by media outlets that are themselves global corporations.  Yet sport 
is more than a function of the much-debated term “globalisation”. Recounting various 
definitions of globalisation is beyond the scope of this analysis, but two are apt here. First 
is Iver Neuman‟s observation on the value of perspective and time: “What is new about 
globalization and what is relevant to diplomacy depends on your time perspective”.23 
Second, Paul Martin‟s account of the tension evident within the phenomena is apt. He 
states that because of the inter-dependence of nations, globalisation has acquired 
“significant contradictory characteristics – one of great hope, anchored in the benefit of 
states working together, and one of great fear, based on the seeming inevitability of 
contagion across borders”.24 Sport sits within this space, thus the case for employing a 
global diplomacy framework to consider sport and diplomacy.
25
 It requires re-examining 
the much-maligned but resilient central character to international relations – the nation-
state – before considering the implications for the fundamentals of diplomacy: 
communication, representation, and negotiation.  
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In considering issues of sport and international politics, Murray, Grix, Allison, 
and others self-consciously limit their analyses in a number of notable regards that 
require further elucidation in understanding sport and diplomacy. For example, Murray‟s 
work thus far focuses on international sport and its relationship to national governments. 
There is a clear emphasis on the nation-state. He clearly delimits his work in stating, 
“neither the relationships between domestic sport and diplomacy nor those existing 
between non-state actors and sport are examined”.26 The challenge is given succinct 
expression by Maclean and Field in identifying a  
taken-for-granted association between sport and nation and between nation and 
state to the extent that much of academic discussion of sport and nation conflates 
them as if they are synonyms, otherwise fails to make the distinction between 
nation and state or accepts that in hegemonic or other dominant discourses the 
state is the proper political vessel for the nation.
27
  
What follows outlines a more nuanced understanding of the role of state and nation in 
sport that facilitates diplomatic practice leading to a networked understanding of sport 
and diplomacy reflecting the panoply of domestic, international, and transnational actors 
involved.  
Amid various models of contemporary diplomacy, two are particularly relevant in 
helping to understand the multiplicity of those involved sport and diplomacy: Geoff 
Wiseman‟s identification of polylateralism and Brian Hocking‟s work on multi-
stakeholder diplomacy. Wiseman identified polylateralism at the turn of the twenty-first 
century as 
11 
 
 
The conduct of relations between official entities (such as a state, several states 
acting together, or a state-based international organization) and at least one 
unofficial, nonstate entity in which there is a reasonable expectation of systematic 
relationships, involving some form of reporting, communication, negotiation, and 
representation, but not involving mutual recognition as sovereign, equivalent 
entities.
28
 
He later described polylateralism as “Diplomacy‟s Third Dimension” in capturing state to 
non-state diplomacy.
29
 Hocking argues for a conception of multi-stakeholder diplomacy 
that sees diplomacy as “concerned with the creation of networks, embracing a range of 
state and non-state actors focusing on the management of issues that demand resources 
over which no single participant possesses a monopoly”.30 Both have salient elements for 
sport and diplomacy in recognising distinct actors involved in the diplomacy operating at 
different levels and conducting relations as part of a network.  
The polities with representative qualities may easily translate to the realm of 
sport, where individual sportsmen and sportswomen, administrative bodies, business 
interests including sponsors, and spectators operate beyond the state as transnational civil 
society actors. Jan Melissen argues that transnationalism is more probable “on low 
politics . . . than on high political issues such as security”, and that “long-term 
transnational relations are more likely to produce success in diplomacy than short-term 
campaigns”.31 As already acknowledged, “sport” in itself is not a panacea to the gravest 
of issues in global affairs; but that transnational relationships are fostered and maintained 
through sporting endeavours helps to explain for example the resilience and longevity of 
international sporting federations and transnational sporting rivalries. So whilst Tom 
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Zeiler sagely observes that transnationalism is “fashionable and an increasingly 
transformative trend” in recounting Nicolson‟s point about the value in observing the 
antecedents of current topography, David Reynolds stresses that transnational thinking is 
not new.
32
 In reflecting on a turn from “transatlantic” to “transnational”, he quotes Arnold 
Wolfers from 1962 stating that corporations‟ and organisations‟ „ability to operate as 
international or transnational actors may be traced to the fact that men identify 
themselves and their interests with corporate bodies other than the nation-state.‟33 In 
doing so, they create a network of transnational relations that serve a range of individual 
identities in what Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye went on to identify as „complex 
interdependence‟.34 Pigman succinctly summarises the impact of such thinking in arguing 
for a „new diplomatic studies paradigm”, where it is necessary to put to one side 
“traditionally assumed separations between the domestic and the international, the public 
and the private, the political and the economic, the social and cultural”.35 It is onto this 
intellectual playing field that global diplomacy steps out.  
In proposing global diplomacy, the aim is to lay out a concept “that recognizes the 
role of diplomacy as an ancient institution separate, but arguably parallel to the idea of 
the form of governance and constantly evolving to reflect shifts in structure and power”.36 
The recognition of there being a heritage to diplomatic practice, along with a relationship 
to power held beyond the state, illustrates the value of this framework to comprehending 
sport and diplomacy.
37
 The centrality of the nation-state to diplomatic studies, and to the 
broader International Relations literature requires no further elucidation than to point to 
John Agnew‟s statement that the field “has been defined by the notion of a world divided 
up into mutually exclusive territorial states”.38 To recount clearly, the designation global 
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diplomacy deploys on four counts that serve to consolidate the analysis of sport and 
diplomacy. First, it reflects discussion of diplomacy that goes beyond the state and, 
indeed, pre-dated 1648; second, it seeks to overarch discussion of “old” and “new” 
diplomacies; next, it argues for the development of the state and consequently the 
diplomacy, or diplomacies, that flow from it; and last, that diplomacy has at its core not 
changed in its nature.
39
 Such a conception positions this analysis between the state-based 
approach of Murray and the others, and the “expansive” understanding of diplomacy put 
forward by the likes of Jason Dittmer, who sees diplomacy as “any interactions between 
peoples or entities in which those peoples and entities are representative of a broader 
category or polity”.40 The reflective dimension to sport and diplomacy takes into account 
communication, representation, and negotiation as a two-way dialogue giving scope for 
greater understanding. As Zeiler acknowledges in his conclusion to Diplomatic Games, 
the discussion of sport and diplomacy has long since moved “past the fact that sport is 
global to the converse: the idea that the global is closely related to play arenas”.41 In other 
words, the transactions of sport and diplomacy go both ways.  
Addressing sport and communications as a facet of global diplomacy raises two 
points: one relates to public diplomacy and the other to technology. Linked, both concern 
the audience for sport. Communication is critical to diplomacy‟s practice: “Being able to 
communicate in technical terms through appropriate language and symbols, and 
emotionally with fellow human beings, is vital to ensure messages are conveyed in the 
way they are intended”.42 It does not always happen of course: either by mistake or 
design by one of the participants. However, as Pigman argues, the “act of competing in 
sport internationally is at its core about communicating to the public”.43 Sport has a 
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powerful capacity to touch individuals and societies around the world in ways that 
traditional forms of diplomacy and diplomats rarely can, particular those practiced by the 
state. Sporting competition always carries social and political messages for these 
audiences; at times these are simple even vulgar, at times complex, subtle, and mixed. 
Whatever the delivered message, manner, or mode, it is important to a desired outcome. 
In this regard, modern information communication technologies have a role to play in the 
narrative of contemporary sport.  
Technology and diplomatic practice have a long-standing relationship. Thinking 
about advances in technology recurrently emerge as providing a silver bullet to the 
challenges of diplomacy. The printing press, radio, telegraph, and then telephone, jet-
travel, and now the so-called “digital” revolution suggest marking out step-changes for 
diplomacy. Whether they had the supposed impact on diplomacy is another matter but, 
similarly, each of these pieces of technology has had an impact on sport. The printing 
press and subsequent telecommunications advances allowed for the development of 
media and then the reporting of sport to a broader public; the jet-engine drastically 
reduced travel times for athletes and spectators, meaning journey‟s that had previously 
taken weeks were now a matter of hours, such as travel between Britain and Australia for 
cricket‟s bi-annual Ashes‟ series. In the past twenty-five years, advances in digital 
technologies have allowed for huge increases in the breadth of coverage and its 
simultaneous consumption of sports wherever they may be taking place on the planet. 
Importantly, technology has not just had an impact on the coverage of sport, but the sport 
itself. “Hawkeye” tracking technology in tennis and cricket, for example, materially 
affects the result of the sporting contest. In turn, technologies have influenced sports‟ 
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communicative quality as spectators and athletes can re-live their lived experience after 
the event. It is little surprise, therefore, that technology and sport go hand-in-hand, 
underpinned by business interests from corporations; an instance is Sky Plc, the European 
network, and its efforts to secure sporting broadcast rights, particularly the continent‟s 
favourite sport – football. As such, the communicative power of sport via new 
technologies has, as Pigman notes, “in effect made international sport a primary 
communication channel in a contemporary environment in which diplomacy increasingly 
involves communication with the global public”.44 Put another way, “International sport 
today is a uniquely well-suited global platform for diplomatic representation of and 
communication between global publics”, and it is representation that needs 
consideration.
45
 
The concept of representation in sport might need little analysis at first glace. Eric 
Hobsbawm famously stated, “the imagined community of millions seems more real as a 
team of eleven named people”.46 Like diplomats, athletes and spectators often have clear 
symbols as to whom they are representing through the badges on their kit or simply the 
colour of their shirts. This fact, however, overlooks the multiple identities that all of the 
actors in contemporary sport possess. For their part, athletes have identities that may 
include their club – in many sports, something that change quickly with at transfer or 
trade. Players‟ nationality is again something that can change as a number of athletes 
have represented more than one country although that does tend to take a little time. For 
sponsors, they can be individual to the athlete or associated with their club or country, or 
any non-governmental organisations or charities with which they are involved, not least 
their own. Last, their race or religion may be relevant. In each case, player identities will 
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be a blend, evolving and reforming simultaneously in relation to their experience that, as 
Manuel Castells puts it in his seminal work The Power of Identity, is central to identity.
47
 
Castells stresses the importance of “shared experience” in forming identity, suggesting 
anything not born out of experience is fantasy.
48
 It applies equally to participants, spurred 
on by the presence and enthusiasm of a crowd, as to spectators. In the case of spectators 
at sporting events, it is the shared experience of being there to see a world record or their 
team lift the cup that is a large part of the attraction of sport. Contemporary social media 
platforms such as Twitter and Facebook allow for a shared experience of sport in the 
absence of being physically present.  
Castells positing of three types of identity in legitimising, resistance, and project 
allows for a further degree of granularity in the analysis of representation and sport and 
diplomacy. He sees legitimising identity as the order “introduced and propagated” by 
establishment power structures, such as the state in traditional diplomacy or the 
“authorities” of a governing body. He second identifies resistance identity that forms in 
opposition to ruling norms and it forms communities of resistance given expression in the 
football chant; “no one likes us, we don‟t care”, and the way managers of sports teams 
build an “us against the world” mantra as a means of extracting a competitive advantage. 
In diplomatic terms, resistance identities may emerge in support of national causes and by 
taking a stand in a multi-stakeholder environment. Finally, Castells calls for a project 
identity that he argues is a constructed one with transformational goals. In sport, the 
transformation of Manchester City Football Club from Manchester‟s second team to 
membership in global elite has been one of representation and communication, as well as 
achievement on the field supported by millions of pounds of Abu Dhabi‟s money. The 
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European “project” in diplomatic terms is one that has been part of the dialogue of 
international affairs for a century, with the European Union and its bureaucracy spawning 
its own diplomacy in the past quarter century. The parallels in the evolution of diplomacy 
and sport warrant further attention. 
As prelude to addressing sport as negotiation, it is worth noting that the focus of 
Pigman and others including Murray on “international sport” serves to restrict the scope 
of sport and diplomacy. Sport‟s communicative or representative attributes are not 
restricted the national boundaries of “international sport” as far as it involves competitors 
donning international jerseys and competing for their nation against other nations. 
Beyond George Orwell‟s concern that international sport gives rise to the unsavoury 
aspects of nationalism, contemporary sport does not fit into clearly demarcated national 
and international categorisations.
 49
 Such is the case of football despite apparently clear 
“international” and “domestic” competitions, such as the Fédération Internationale de 
Football Association [FIFA] World Cup or the English Premier League.  There is a 
bleeding of jurisdictions, or sovereignty to use a term familiar to traditional forms of 
diplomacy, between and amongst individuals, clubs, national football associations, and 
regional federations such as the Union of European Football Associations, Europe‟s the 
governing football body.  
Sport is organised by international federations of national associations, played at 
the same stadia, sponsored by broadly the same companies, and, crucially to a global 
audience, involving the same players. Cristiano Ronaldo does not stop being a Real 
Madrid CF player whilst wearing his national Portuguese kit or vice versa. Nor 
importantly does he stop being the recipient of endorsement dollars from multi-national 
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corporations and promoting his own brand, “CR7”. Seemingly, domestic leagues have 
transnational identities because of their multi-national cast of players and global 
corporations that sponsor and broadcast the spectacle, not least because of their matches 
sometimes played in other countries. Since 2007, the American National Football League 
[NFL], the league with the greatest revenue by some margin at over €13 million, has 
played regular season games outside the United States in London and, in October 2005, 
in Mexico City, the first NFL game played outside the United States.
50
 The English 
Premier League toyed with the idea of a “39th game” in 2008 to add an international 
fixture to its 38-game season. The rationale here is straightforward: the global public 
audience for sport whether domestic or international is vast and drives the associated 
business.  
Further, sport has a heritage in the past century and one-half in imperial projects 
as a tool of nation building, and consequently the relevance of nation-state. One can look 
to plentiful examples and associated literature such as Kidambi‟s account of the 1911 tour 
of an all-Indian cricket team, 36 years before India became independent.
51
 All of this is to 
say that representation of identities matters in sport, and hence to the relationship 
between sport and diplomacy. 
 The third dimension to further the understanding of sport and diplomacy through 
the global diplomacy framework is to consider sport as negotiation. In this realm, two 
related aspects exist; one is the way in which international sporting federations [ISFs] 
operate; the other is the way that sport inter-acts with the state through its federations and 
through its business partners.  The operation of ISFs has drawn a great deal of popular 
attention in the past in the past two decades. Scandal has rocked the two organisations – 
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the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and FIFA – that organise the biggest 
sporting events, the quadrennial Summer Olympic Games and Football World Cup, 
which has questioned their existential longevity. Former England striker and now media 
pundit, Gary Leneker, stated in the May 2015 that FIFA was a “revolting organisation”, 
and that “if any other organisation of the planet was found to be as corrupt as FIFA, then 
the man at the top would go”.52 It is not the purpose of this article to recount the scandals 
surrounding the award of the 2002 Winter Olympic Games to Salt Lake City or the 
protracted demise of Sepp Blatter‟s leadership regime in FIFA; suffice it to say for the 
purposes of this analysis that the case of the former illustrates that redemption is 
possible.
53
 What is of note here is the way in which both organisations, as the pre-
eminent multi-sport and pre-eminent single sport, have operated and negotiated in 
diplomatic circles.  
The development of the modern Olympic movement and FIFA parallel in many 
ways the evolution of international organisations of nation-states since the mid-late 
nineteenth century. They have been subject to the impact of global wars, the process of 
decolonisation and birth of new states, and have acted as talisman to the other 
developments of other sporting bodies both for individual and multi-sport events. Beyond 
these parallels, nonetheless, lies a more nuanced “mimicking” of diplomatic behaviours. 
McConnell, Moreau and Dittmer have brought Homi Bhabha‟s notion of mimicry into 
the diplomatic field, here extended in two regards.
54
 These are the lead taken by sports‟ 
organisations from international politics writ large, and the way other ISFs have looked to 
FIFA and the IOC particularly and adopted their practices.  Coming with it, a number of 
their problems have been found out in recent times, for instance, by the Union Cycliste 
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Internationale, cycling‟s world body, and the International Association of Athletics 
Federations, athletics‟ worldwide governing organisation. 
To have survived and grown, FIFA and the IOC have had to negotiate internally 
and with external polities.
55
 Internal negotiations took place over the logistics and 
organisation of sport – the “rules of the game”. Determining these seemingly fixed 
aspects of sport – the size of the pitch, the scoring system, or the length of a race – occurs 
in negotiated agreements between the stakeholders in sport at various times facilitated by 
these kind of organisations as forums of negotiation. External negotiations have always 
been part of sports organisations to gain what business analysts would call “market share” 
of participation, audience, and revenue, which have been part of sports mantra since the 
mid-late nineteenth century. More recently though, it is accurate to say both have 
established considerable financial and commercial dimensions as brokers of sponsorship 
and media deals worth billions of dollars. 
  Both organisations have mimicked each other in establishing and maintaining 
relationships with the United Nations [UN]. FIFA has prominently displayed its 
association with the UN since 1999 when then Secretary General Kofi Annan and Blatter 
agreed to share common values.  The IOC received the endorsement of Annan‟s 
successor, Ban Ki Moon, in 2009 when he stated, “Olympic principles are United Nations 
principles”; it came at the same time as the IOC gained Observer Status at the UN – a 
first for a non-state actor.
56
 Black and Peacock have noted the IOC “formally. . . often 
portrayed itself as the United Nations of global sport”. They go on to say that in “many 
ways the IOC has constructed a parallel universe of global power . . . that shadows the 
political realities of international diplomacy”.57 The constituent members of the IOC and 
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FIFA have predominantly been national bodies over the past century with interests that 
reflect national and then regional interests. As such, it should be of little surprise that they 
behave in a manner that nation-states have done in structures akin to the “club 
diplomacy” mentality that maintained the pre-eminence of the state in international 
politics. In focusing upon FIFA and the IOC, it is important not to over-stress the 
parallels and overlook the notable distinguishing between the two organisations and 
between the multitude of other ISFs that constitute important and heterogeneous actors in 
multi-stakeholder diplomacy.  
The second related aspect of sport and negotiation is to analyse the relationship 
between sport and the other “stakeholders” operating in global diplomacy. Here it is 
important to stress the that the relationship is multi-direction or networked, that it flows 
from the athletes, clubs, events, or organisations to other constituent parts such as 
national governments, media corporations, or international organisations and back. 
Jonathan Grix focuses in sport politics upon how governments have sough to manipulate 
sport to their own ends and calls on his previous work on East Germany to illustrate it. 
The example provided by Hitler‟s 1936 Olympic Games is perhaps the most egregious 
attempt, but no event on that scale – a mega-event – escapes such attention.58 As written 
previously, “International sporting competition is perceived increasingly as an ideal 
channel for nations, regions and cities to share their identities, their merits and “brands” 
with the rest of the world”.59 The first decade of the twenty-first century saw great deal of 
negotiation – some far from open – over the hosting of mega-events in cities around the 
globe involving every conceivable stakeholder. Whilst financial imperatives drive much 
of this effort, sport offers an avenue for the “pursuit of status or prestige [and] is an 
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under-appreciated objective of much international diplomatic activity”.60 This notion is 
prevalent in varying degrees across three reports that came out in Britain in 2014 from, 
respectively, the House of Lords, the British Council, and the British Academy.
61
  
On the other hand, when negotiation begins with sport, it has the opportunity to 
influence government on at least two fronts. The first is because of the access that sport 
provides to publics at home and overseas.  According to Tim Vine, head of Public Affairs 
at the English Premier League, “I think we provide government with opportunities to get 
into parts of the country they cannot reach through other sports or means”. Vine goes on, 
“Football does have an attraction that goes beyond any other”.62 As the global game, and 
has the head of a league considered “the most competitive and cosmopolitan in the 
world”, Vine‟s remarks have resonance.63 The second dimension is of sport as enabler of 
government diplomacy; again, according to Vine, “UK Trade and Industry and the 
Foreign Office have woken up to the opportunities we provide them certainly over the 
course of I think this last five years”. To that extent, the British government “really have 
done well off the back of that [opportunity]”. In this regard, the nation-state is benefitting 
from the enabling diplomacy of sport.  
The counterpart is when sport shapes policy of governments or other diplomatic 
actors through their diplomatic negotiation. To return to the IOC and FIFA in awarding 
their quadrennial jamborees, they make particular requirements mandatory such as 
temporary changes to tax regimes, which in other lights would be a noticeable 
infringement of national sovereignty. Equally, if more obliquely, these organisations‟ 
exacting bid-requirements mean governments have to make resource decisions that may 
well stimulate a diplomatic outcome as was seen in the anti-government protests in Brazil 
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in 2013 preceding the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympic games. The impact of these 
protests was to add a different perspective to the 2014 event although the football would 
pass off without any great incident. 
“Politicians love sports, and gets them in the papers a lot quicker than anything 
other than a horrific mistake”.64 Politicians are not alone in loving sports of course, and 
most with an interest in sport are more likely to want to read about sport in their 
newspapers rather than worry about being in print. What these remarks suggest is there is 
clearly a relationship between sport and politics. However, there is also one between 
sport and diplomacy; until recent times, it has received only parsimonious attention in 
academia and elsewhere. As noted in this analysis, the initial work in this field has 
focused on “sport diplomacy” that has necessitated a distinctly state-based focus; but it is 
self-consciously limited. By considering sport in direct relation to the three fundamental 
attributes of global diplomacy – communications, representation, and negotiation – it is 
possible to de-centre the state, and a more nuanced appreciate of the practice of sport and 
diplomacy emerges. In other words, consideration of sport and diplomacy provides 
another opportunity for the recasting of the centrality of state and the leakage of 
diplomatic practices to other polities. Therefore it is little surprise to hear the likes of 
Vine looking beyond the state when he says that when English Premier League 
undertakes overseas tours, “not only are you representing the sport more broadly on 
behalf of the country, you are actually representing the sport and its development in that 
country”.65  
Beyond these considerations, this analysis has shown that considering sport and 
diplomacy in light of a global diplomacy framework raises a number of the issues that 
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require further attention. Just one example: naming the South Stand at their Old Trafford 
ground the “Sir Bobby Charlton Stand” from April 2016, Manchester United described 
their former player as a “diplomat” and that “he represents everything that is good about 
football and Manchester United”. In doing so, it gives rise to the opportunity to explore 
the role of individual sportspeople as diplomats and ambassadors, including some content 
analysis of sporting organisations that have “ambassadors” or organisations that use 
sporting stars as “ambassadors”.66  
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